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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
POWER TO REGULATE USE OF PROPERTY ADJACENT TO SUPERHIGHWAY MUST
BE SPECIFICALLY CONFERRED
The development of the New York Thruway and similar limited access
state highways has required the courts to construe statutes regulating the use of
adjacent private property by private citizens. Two such cases are New York
State Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court, Inc.'3 and Schulman v.
People,'4 decided this term.
In the Ashley case, the Thruway Authority sued under the Public
Authorities Law, Section 361-a, 15 to enjoin the maintenance of, and to require
removal of, a billboard advertising a nearby motel, joining as defendants the
motel owner, the landowner, and the company which maintained the sign.
Defendants contended that enforcement of the provision concerning aesthetic
values constituted an unjustifiable application of the police power of the state.
The Court was not required to decide whether aesthetic considerations alone
would provide sufficient basis for the exercise of the police power inasmuch as
it found that the other provisions of the statute upon which plaintiff based its
action furnished sufficient justification. "The fact that considerations of an
aesthetic nature also exist does not take away [its] authority to act."' 0 While
noting the existence of some disagreement among the authorities on the
question of whether billboard advertising actually interferes with safe driving,
the Court stated that where a matter is properly the subject of legislative
determination, the results will not be disturbed unless manifestly unreasonable.
In considering defendants' contention that the statute amounts to a
deprivation of property without due process of law, the Court noted that the
value of the property to the defendants arose from the construction of the
highway by the state and, therefore, the defendants cannot complain if it is
taken away by the same power.' 7 Even if the defendants did have a valid
property right, however, "where the protective power of the state is exercised
in a manner otherwise appropriate in the regulation of business, it is no
objection that the performance of existing contracts be frustrated by the
prohibition of injurious practices,' 8 and "no obligation of a contract can extend
to the defeat of legitimate government authority."'0
In the Schulman case, the Court of Appeals considered the power of the
13. 10 N.Y.2d 151, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961).
14. 10 N.Y.2d 249, 219 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1961).
15. The declared intent of N.Y. Public Authorities Law § 361-a is: (a) To provide for
maximum system and connecting roads or highways; (b) To prevent unreasonable distrac-
tion of operators of motor vehicles; (c) To prevent confusion with regard to traffic
lights, signs or signals or otherwise interfere with the effectiveness of traffic regulations;
(d) To preserve and enhance the natural scenic beauty or the aesthetic features of the
thruway system and adjacent areas; (e) To promote safety, comfort and well-being of
the users of the thruway.
16. Perlmutter v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 331, 182 N.E. 5, 6 (1932).
17. But cf. Andrews v. State, 9 N.Y.2d 606, 217 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1961).
18. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438 (1934).
19. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 551 (1870).
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Superintendent of Public Works to likewise regulate the use of private 'property
adjacent to a limited access highway constructed under his authority. It
refused to extend Section 30(2) of the Highway Law,20 which gives the
Superintendent the authority to condemn property necessary for the construction
and improvement of highways including appropriation of property for ditches,
drains, etc., and for other purposes to improve safety conditions of the state
highway system; to include the power to condemn an easement in property along
a state highway for purposes of eliminating the erection of any billboard or
other advertising device.
The Superintendent argued that the part of the statute which reads "and
for other purposes to improve safety conditions on the state highway system"
must be construed to confer upon him the powers granted by other statutes
relating to specific portions of state highways. 21 In this contention he was
upheld by the Appellate Division22 which stated:
The argument for strict construction of every public power to
condemn private property, urged by plaintiffs, will be seen on close
examination to turn largely on acquisitions by private corporations
vested with public uses, such as a railroad . . or a telephone
company ....
Where a state officer acts in pursuance of a general statute there
is certainly no judicial compulsion to read the statute heavily weighted
against the exercise of a right of acquisition for which the state is
willing, and must pay, just compensation. The function of the Superin-
tendent of Public Works should not be narrowly construed in this
respect, where his purpose may reasonably be seen by the court to
move in the direction of improving safety conditions on public roads
under an affirmative mandate to do so.
23
The Court of Appeals, however, applying the rule of ejusdem generis, found
no similarity between the authority the Superintendent attempted to invoke,
and the authority actually granted by the preceeding portions of the statute. As
further evidence of the legislature's intention, the Court noted that bills which
would have conferred the authority on the Superintendent were introduced
but not passed, in the 1952, 1957, 1959, and 1960 sessions.24 Thus the Court
reversed the decision of the Appellate Division and reinstated that of the trial
court.
The power of the Thruway Authority and the Superintendent of Public
Works to restrict the erection of billboards on private property along state
20. N.Y. Highway Law § 30(2).
21. See N.Y. Public Authorities Law § 361(a), and § 569(b); N.Y. Conservation Law
§ 675, which prohibit the erection of advertising signs within certain distances of specified
highways, parks, etc.
22. 11 A.D.2d 273, 203 N.Y.S.2d 708 (3d Dep't 1960).
23. Id. at 276, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
24. 1952 Assembly Int. Nos. 1308, 1309, Pr. Nos. 1327, 1328; 1957 Assembly Int.
No. 4179, Pr. No. 4968; 1959 Senate Int. & Pr. No. 725; 1959 Assembly Int. Nos. 1441,
3815, 3894, Pr. Nos. 1444, 3960, 4039; 1960 Senate Int. No. 1197, Pr. Nos. 1200, 1571.
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highways- must be fairly specifically conferred by statute. Although in sympathy
with the idea of vesting such authority in the Superintendent of Public Works,
the Court will not imply it in the absence of a clear legislative intent to do so.
At first glance it would appear that the Court is giving the Public
Authorities Law a fairly liberal construction and the Highway Law a very strict
one, but it must be noted that in the case of the former there is express provision
for the exercise of the Thruway Authority's power, and the defendant is
attacking the validity of the Act itself. In the Schulman case the question is
the interpretation of one clause of the Highway Law. It cannot be said that the
Court is being more liberal when it upholds the validity of an act, than when
it refuses to construe the provisions of an act as granting powers it feels the
legislature never intended.
Granting this distinction, this still is not a proper case for the application
of the rule of ejusdem generis. The words "and for other purposes" must be
read in the context of the entire which reads "and for other purposes to improve
safety conditions on the state highway system." The prior clauses of the Law
did not refer to improving safety conditions and, therefore, the "and for other
purposes" clause does not serve as a catch-all for the preceding clauses, but
confers additional power on the Superintendent. As the Appellate Division
stated, the determination of whether an action is necessary to improve safety
conditions is for the Superintendent to decide and the courts should not
interfere with his decision unless it is on its face unreasonable.
25
T. C. L.
DECONTROL ORDER REQUIRED FOR EMERGENCY RENT
In In re Sipal Realty Corp.26 the landlord sought increased rent under the
emergency rent provisions of Section 2 of the Emergency Business Space Rent
Control Law.2 7 Since under Section 2, emergency rent is available only in
rentals of business property, the landlord alleged that it was engaged in the
rental of "business space" as defined in Section 2. For the whole premises to
qualify as "business space" when only a portion is actually rented for business
use, it is necessary that 60 percent of the rentable area and units be "lawfully
occupied as business space."'28 Among the units counted as business space to
25. Supra note 22 at 274, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 711. The court then goes on to discuss
why it thinks that the exercise of the power was not unreasonable in this case.
26. 8 N.Y.2d 319, 206 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1960).
27. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 8552(c) (McKinney 1961) provides:
(c) 'Emergency Rent.' The rent reserved or payable under any lease, agreement,
or tenancy of business space in force on June first, nineteen hundred forty-four,
plus fifty per centum of such rent . . . ; provided, however, that if the business
space was not used or occupied as business space on June first, ninteen hundred
forty-four, the emergency rent shall be the reasonable rent therefore as business
space on such date, plus fifty per centum thereof, to be fixed by agreement, by
arbitration, or by the supreme court upon the basis of the rent charged on such
date for the most nearly comparable business space in the same building or other
rental area, or other satisfactory evidence; . ...
28. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 8552(a) (McKinney 1961) provides:
